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Abstract – The adoption of Software-Defined 
Networking (SDN), a networking approach where data 
traffic control and execution are made independent of each 
other, is an ongoing process that some companies are 
considering as an option but have not embraced yet due to 
different factors.  Incorporating this new paradigm into an 
existing network defines a shift in networking technology 
with different benefits expected to derive from this 
implementation. These benefits include (1) the ability to 
use customised business specific applications, (2) reduce 
overhead costs on legacy network infrastructure, taking 
full control of network, (3) reduce network application 
update time, increase productivity, and (4) apply increased 
security among others.  However, the security of SDN itself 
has been a subject of debate. This is mainly because, the 
communication standard used by SDN, known as 
OpenFlow, and developed by the Open Network 
Foundation, does not enforce the implementation of the 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) but defines it only as 
optional. This could then make the network infrastructure 
vulnerable and therefore affect the overall security of a 
company. Security plays a significant part in an 
organisation and it is one of the determinants of the 
success of SDN. OpenFlow security relies on the 
implementation of TLS, which has been proven 
vulnerable, and therefore bringing to mind the question on 
how secure organisation’s data is when the 
implementation of secure data transfer is treated with 
laxity. This paper focuses on securing OpenFlow 
communication in SDN by summarising TLS security 
flaws and recommending ways of improving TLS security 
thereby securing OpenFlow communication. 
Keywords – Software Defined Network; OpenFlow; 
Network Security; SSL/TLS 
1. INTRODUCTION
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is a new networking 
paradigm that enables the separation of the intelligence 
(control) and packet forwarding (data) planes within a single 
network infrastructure. This approach differs from the 
traditional network infrastructure setup where both, 
intelligence and data forwarding functionalities, are placed 
together in network devices such as switches and routers. 
SDN’s separation made it necessary to introduce a new 
communication protocol known as OpenFlow, which enables 
communication between the network devices and its 
controller. The acceptance of this paradigm is gradually 
increasing.  Different factors contribute to this such as 
network flexibility, centralised management, reduced 
administrative costs and network control and among others 
[1].  Organisations such as Google and Amazon have 
implemented SDN as part of their cloud based infrastructure 
and academic institutions, such as Stanford University, have 
implemented it within their existing networks. However, an 
embrace of the new paradigm is still not certain [2], [3]. 
Figure 1 shows the SDN system setup. 
Figure 1: A sample SDN system setup with control and switching functions 
separate [4]. 
Current research explores the pros and cons of the use of 
SDN with a special focus on security, which remains an on-
going issue that affects every organisation.  The cost of data 
loss due to a security flaw has a heavy impact within an 
organisation, causing closure of businesses and financial.   
Transport Layer Security (TLS) is implemented in order to 
provide security to data communication in OpenFlow between 
the data and control plane. Of interest is that the Open 
Network Foundation (ONF) does not recommend the 
implementation of TLS as mandatory.  The reason could be 
that there are other network communication protocols such as 
the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), Multiprotocol Label 
Switching (MPLS), NETCONF (IETF Network management 
protocol) [5]. This, therefore, gives OpenFlow-enabled 
infrastructure vendors the freedom to use what seems better 
for them rather than particular protocols being imposed on 
them. 
As of 2014, and even with recent data breaches and 
network exposures, the implementation of secure OpenFlow 
communication using the Transport Layer Security (TLS) is 
still optional [6] and only recommended as the default security 
mechanism in 2015 [7].  On the other hand, the Open Network 
Foundation also recommended TCP as an alternative transport 
protocol despite the security challenges associated with it [8]. 
The functionality of SDN depends on the communication 
between the controller(s) and the switches therefore making it 
fundamental to secure OpenFlow. A flow is installed on the 
switch through instruction it receives from the controller, and 
also, data packets are forwarded, depending on instructions 
from the controller through the OpenFlow link [9].  
On the other hand, communication through OpenFlow is 
secured using TLS, raising the question how secure is the 
Transport Layer Security in the face of attacks? Secondly, 
since the use of the TLS protocol is recommended rather than 
mandatory, not all SDN vendors implement it. This 
undermines the importance of security, which is the very focus 
of this paper on how to provide an extension to TLS to 
mitigate attacks against TLS such as Man in the Middle 
(MiTM) attacks. 
This paper is divided into six sections.  The first section 
gives an introductory discussion of the paper.  Section two 
gives a brief background to Software-defined network (SDN) 
challenges while section three is on OpenFlow and 
communication security.  Section four is on the challenges of 
the Transport Layer Security (TLS) and existing solutions to 
TLS. Finally, section five talks about proposed TLS extension 
while, section six highlights further studies. 
2. SDN BACKGROUND AND CHALLENGES
SDN as a networking paradigm provides a programmable 
interface for network administrators to use non-legacy 
applications on their network, make changes on-demand and 
not depending on vendor-specific hardware or protocols. 
Customised business software can be implemented following 
a company’s policy and bringing more control to the network 
administrator, unlike the conventional network setup where 
both the control and distribution functionalities are fused 
together and can communicate freely.  
In SDN, the logical (control) and distribution (data) planes 
are different entities, one residing in the controller (control) 
and the other on the switches (data). Therefore, for both planes 
to communicate, an intermediary is needed, which the ONF 
proposed to be OpenFlow.  
To secure communication between the controller and the 
switch, Transport Layer Security (TLS) should be enabled 
within the OpenFlow protocol, which is the transport link. 
However, as mentioned earlier, implementing TLS to secure 
OpenFlow communication has been defined as optional by the 
Open Network Foundation [10].  Network administrators have 
the choice of choosing what security protocol they wish to use 
depending on the type of programmable networks they want to 
use [11], [12], [13], [14].  This is one of the benefits of 
Software-Defined Networks as different organisations can 
implement their customised applications.  On the other hand, 
if not considered properly, this flexibility comes with the risk 
of affecting the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the 
transmitted data. 
It is possible to argue that, vulnerabilities were discovered 
because of the underlying hardware infrastructure and semi-
independent setup of the technology, a great difference 
between the traditional network setup and that of the SDN. 
There is also the external programmable aspect [15] of it and 
the communication pattern between network nodes (switch 
and the controller). Table 1 is a list of the attack vectors and 
solution given. 
Table 1: List of SDN security challenges and solutions 
S/N ATTACK VECTOR 
POSSIBLE 
ATTACK 
MEDIUM 
SOLUTION 
1 Third party applications Controller 
Authentication/ 
authorisation of 
applications 
2 Client 
Client 
programmable 
interface 
Resource isolation, 
define privilege level 
3 Network deployment 
Configuration 
mistakes 
Avoiding previous 
known security 
weaknesses 
4 Controller communication 
Controller and 
applications Define trust boundaries 
5 
Client 
programmatic 
access 
Client Resource isolation and limits 
6 Multi-controller environment 
Inappropriate 
configuration 
Compatibility check 
and boundary 
definition 
7 Use of legacy protocols 
Controller and 
Switch Compatibility check 
8 
Inter-domain 
connection with 
different legacy 
controllers 
Inter-
communication 
methods 
Clear definition of 
security dependencies 
9 OpenFlow 
Deployment 
errors and 
obsolete protocol 
use 
Use of recommended 
TLS v1.2 
Though there is more than one point to breach Software-
Defined Networks [16], most of the SDN security analysis 
focuses on OpenFlow. In one research [17], the security 
analysis of OpenFlow in SDN was looked at but not the 
security protocol itself.  To the best of our knowledge, this is 
the first work focused primarily on the security of TLS 
protocol used in SDN with emphasis on enhancing the 
protocol for increased security. 
With a decoupled controller, SDN technology presents a 
single point of failure [18].  However, there is provision for 
multiple controllers [19] with the requirement of a high level 
of administrative know-how.  The need for highly skilled 
programming should be free of errors, which, if undiscovered, 
would be a point of exploiting in the network.  Most 
organisations that have implemented the technology are cloud 
based [20]. This could be viewed as one of the reasons smaller 
organisations don’t feel confident to implement or accept it 
yet [21].  There is a need for a holistic strategy for secure 
deployment because of new security.   
There are other challenging factors that could impact so 
much on the technology.  Table 2 highlights some of these 
challenges. 
Table 2: Other SDN challenges 
S/N CHALLENGES
1 Controller placement 
2 Scalability 
3 Performance 
4 Security 
5 Interoperability 
6 Reliability 
7 Device authentication (making sure the right device is 
configured and can communicate) 
8 Trust issues 
9 Lack of good policy framework 
10 Addressing dynamic changes with new devices 
Resolving the challenges in SDN places the technology in 
a higher acceptance level.  The right placement [22] of 
controllers increases the chances of availability of resources to 
users or access to the network, especially in a large network 
environment such as data centres. Using a single controller 
will not only impact negatively on the performance of the 
network, it also risks network failure.  Also, network 
congestion will be experienced. This, therefore, demands 
multi-controller implementation to provide network 
availability and data packet flows.  
However, the challenges are linked as one affects the 
other.  One of the best attributes of SDN is its flexibility to 
expand and adapt to the different needs within the 
organisation.  Device authentication and trust within the 
network devices is very important [22], [23].  Communication 
should be only between trusted and authenticated devices to 
avoid communication between untrusted devices. Also, 
efficient and reliable flow management [24] is important for 
SDN to achieve its purpose.  There is a need for cost 
effectiveness of which interoperability and security should be 
guaranteed without which, the purpose of abstraction of the 
network devices is defeated. 
Though SDN presents different challenges, this research 
focuses on securing the communication between the controller 
and the switch as it represents one of the biggest security 
flaws within SDN. 
3. OPENFLOW AND COMMUNICATION SECURITY
OpenFlow version 1.0 was first introduced in 2009 and has
gone through changes to improve on the functionalities such 
as running FlowVisor.  As of January 2015, the current 
version is 1.5 [25]. 
One of the changes to networking as enabled by Software-
Defined Networks is the communication link between the 
Controller and Switch via OpenFlow.  The Open Network 
Foundation standardised the protocol as the communication 
interface between the switch and the controller [10] however, 
other communication and network configuration protocols 
exist [26] such as NETCONF. 
The importance of the protocol cannot be overlooked 
because of its role as the medium of network configuration 
and communication; hence, it is vital to appropriately and 
adequately secure the protocol. This is not only for the 
acceptance of the technology, but also to provide 
confidentiality, integrity and authentication of every data 
packet and avoid unnecessary data exposures. 
In securing data traffic or communication within 
OpenFlow, there is the need to look further to the base 
protocol that provides the security, which is the Transport 
Layer Security (TLS), the recommended data encryption 
protocol currently is version 1.2 [8].  It is also the most used 
protocol not only within OpenFlow but also throughout the 
Internet [27], [28]. TLS version 1.3 is a working draft at the 
moment. 
The Transport Layer Security is divided into two layers 
(Record and Handshake).  Although the record layer 
encapsulates the handshake layer, they perform different 
functions such as data link encryption, device authentication 
(client and server). One aspect has been silently overlooked 
which is the authentication [29] of network elements while 
more attention is given to the cryptographic part of the 
protocol. Figure 2 below shows a client-server handshake 
messages. 
Figure 2: Client-Server handshake process [30] 
4. CHALLENGES OF TLS
The challenges of the transport layer security dates back to 
the first SSL implementation in the 90s and since then 
subsequent versions have also been targeted of which TLS 1.2 
is not an exception.    
One of the requests from a server to client during an 
SSL/TLS handshake is the request for client certificates. 
Unfortunately, during the handshakes, client certificate 
authentications most times never occur and have remained 
optional.  
The Transport Layer Security protocol has faced different 
attacks, placing it under constant threat [31], [32], [33], [34], 
[35].  Most of these attacks are not new [36] but rather are 
modified to affect newer versions of the security protocols. 
Also, the improper configuration [37], [38], [39] of TLS 
results in the introduction of more vulnerabilities. 
In an effort to provide countermeasures, several solutions 
have been rolled out for the different versions of the protocol, 
however, the attacks are modified to reveal new vulnerabilities 
as the cases of DROWN [40] and Transcript Collision Attacks 
[41]. 
These solutions include: 
• Disabling older versions of the protocol,
• Providing no support for vulnerable versions
• Totally uninstalling such version from the server
• Use of alternate protocol
Unfortunately, these countermeasures are targeting specific 
attacks [42], [43], which at times open other vulnerabilities 
and become attack points.  
5. PROPOSED TLS SUGGESTION AND EXTENSION
The Transport Layer Security is a standardized protocol.
However, and for different reasons, it is still open to attacks, 
especially Man-in-The-Middle (MiTM). In order to secure the 
OpenFlow communications in Software-Defined Networks, a 
security extension is proposed.  Figure 3 shows the steps 
proposed for TLS extension to mitigate man-in-the-middle 
attack. Table 3 shows the handshake message. 
PROPOSED TLS EXTENSION 
(1) Client hello
(2) Server hello
Client Hello, Random value, Cipher Suite supported, 
compression method, extensions including Session 
Ticket
Server Hello, Random value, 
CipherSuite, Server certificate, Client 
certificate request
(3) Server Cert ificate
Server Cert ificate, Server Key Exchange (chosen 
encryption parameter, secure level and signature 
hash algorithm, Server hello Done
(4) Client key exchange
Client Key Exchange, Chosen encryption parameter 
(Encrypted value with server public key), Changer 
cipher Spec (pre-master key)
(5) Send client certificate (compulsory)
(6) Verify client 
certificate
(compulsory)
Provide Server 
with requested 
certificate 
(compulsory)
(6a) Compulsory status request with random 
number + timestamp to respond + initial client 
hello ID
(6b) Reply to compulsory status request with 
random number + timestamp to respond + 
initial client hello ID
(7) Client finished
(8) Server finished
(9) Exchange messages
(Encrypted with shared secret key
Figure 3: Proposed change to TLS  
CHANGE TO EXISTING TLS STRUCTURE 
Table 3: Change to the existing TLS 
The proposal seeks to enhance TLS through: 
1. Making steps 5 and 6 of the handshake between a
client and server, which requests a client to present
its certificate to the server for authentication
compulsory.
2. Before sending a client and server finished messages,
a re-verification of client and server statuses should
occur. The server sends a randomised status re-
verification request with a time frame for the client to
reply.
3. The verification should include the client hello
message ID.
4. On a successful reply, the client and server Finished
messages should be transmitted.
5. In a failed instance, because of time expires, the
server should end the handshake.
These improvements will lock out an impersonator 
because of the timestamp to reply.  The time it takes an 
attacker to decipher the randomized number will definitely 
exceed the time frame for client response to server request.  
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In conclusion, TLS is still used almost in every computer 
networks, however, considering the technique of DROWN 
which, is a time based Man-in-the-Middle attack, the 
enhancement of the TLS, would counter every of such attacks 
and also increase the TLS security in every network in theory. 
To achieve this aim and validate the proposed solution, a 
virtual network will be setup and the enhanced TLS tested and 
a formal method technique will be used. The test will compare 
time difference with normal TLS, accuracy of attack 
mitigation, and the effectiveness to stop DROWN attacks. 
The formal method will be used to verify that the exchange of 
messages remains error prone and optimal. 
This specific formal method will verify the practical 
security it provides in protecting against Man-in-The-Middle 
attacks in OpenFlow and in general TLS applications.  To the 
best of our knowledge, there is no other OpenFlow 
communication security that directly focuses on the root 
communication security protocol. 
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